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Abstract 
 
Working on a unbalanced sample of OECD countries spanning the period 1970-2003, this paper 
contributes to the empirical literature on the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle by making three main 
innovations: First, it goes beyond the traditional national-level investment-saving equations to 
estimate, for the first time, regressions at the institutional sector level (households, corporations, 
and government). Second, it explores the implications of giving separate consideration to 
current account deficits and surpluses. Lastly, it uses advanced panel data techniques to deal 
with endogeneity and to distinguish long- and short-run effects. After discarding the influence 
of common factors, the conclusions are that: (i) The national Feldstein-Horioka coefficient is in 
the vicinity of 0.5, but sectoral coefficients are much lower and even insignificantly different 
from zero; (ii) Such positive and significant national coefficient would not reflect frictions in 
international credit markets but just a fiscal current account targeting policy; (iii) Nevertheless, 
when the sample is split into deficit and surplus years, a higher and significant correlation 
emerges for the former at the national, household, and corporate level, implying that credit 
imperfections still play a role for the private but not for the public sector. Equally noteworthy, 
household correlation is still positive and significant, yet lower, for surplus years; and (iv) 
Against the background of a unitary long-run coefficient to satisfy the intertemporal budget 
constraint, the long-run relationship is 0.75 for national data, 0.6 for the corporate sector, and 
marginally or non-significant at the household and government level. 
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Introduction 
 
The seminal paper of Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka (1980) unleashed a heated 
debate that still mesmerizes scholars and remains at the center of the macroeconomic 
research agenda. In its simplest form, the Feldstein-Horioka (henceforth, FH) test 
consists of running a regression of the national investment rate on the national saving 
rate, either for cross-section, time series or panel data. Let β be the estimated 
coefficient. Allegedly, β=1 indicates financial autarky (the usual macroeconomic 
identity of a closed economy) and β=0 signals full capital mobility. FH´s finding that 
the investment and saving rates are highly correlated has proven to be a robust stylized 
fact for both industrial and developing countries over time. Our principal goal is to 
bring attention into the institutional sector breakdown of saving and investment under 
the conviction that it should enrich our understanding of this famous and polemic issue 
in international finance. We will be working with a unbalanced sample of OECD 
countries spanning the period 1970-2003. The choice of this particular dataset was 
motivated by the unavailability of investment and saving time series by institutional 
sector in most countries and because the odds that Feldstein-Horioka should fail are the 
highest in view of their level of economic, institutional and financial development. The 
widespread statistical acceptance of a sizable yet decreasing correlation becomes, as a 
result, both intriguing and challenging. 
 
Indeed, the correspondence between high capital mobility and the value of β is 
disputable on intuitive grounds. For example, as discussed in Sachsida and Caetano 
(2000), a country running each year a constant current account deficit to GDP of 10% 
with investment and saving to GDP moving upward and downward at the same pace 
would yield a β coefficient equal to one, even though most people would characterize 
this country as facing high capital mobility. One can come up with other odd cases: The 
same country with its constant 10% external deficit, but with investment and saving 
stuck over time at 30% and 20% of GDP, would have now a zero β coefficient. 
Moreover, some empirical studies take the proportion of the change in investment 
financed with external saving as a measure of capital mobility (see Sachs (1981) and 
Glick and Rogoff (1995)), but such measure is difficult to reconcile with the Feldstein-
Horioka coefficient. Put in other words, FH is a nice measure of how well the current 
account varies to fill the gaps between investment and saving, when the latter variables 
are subjected to large and asymmetric shocks, but it is not the ultimate test of capital 
mobility.  
 
Nevertheless, the intellectual and policy value of the Feldstein-Horioka test should not 
be undermined by this controversy. At the end of the day, it remains a powerful test of 
international financial constraints. In perfect international capital markets (free from 
intermediation costs, asymmetric information, and other frictions), a country should be 
indifferent to finance its investment with domestic or foreign saving. On the contrary, 
evidence that domestic investment tracks domestic saving implies that international 
capital mobility is not perfect. Rephrasing, a  β coefficient positive and significantly 
different from zero supports the lack of full capital mobility. This approach is borrowed 
from the test designed for individual companies by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988), who run investment equations on internal funds, claiming that a positive and 
significant coefficient, after controlling for investment opportunities, is an indication of 
financial constraints.
1,2
  
 
The critique that has shed the darkest shadows over the validity of this test as a measure 
of capital mobility is that they might be an artifact of economic and statistical 
shortcomings. For the sake of exposition, we can classify the arguments into the 
following categories: 
 
a. Endogeneity. Whenever the saving rate is positively correlated with the error term, 
the β coefficient will be upward biased, regardless of the true degree of financial 
constraints. One frequently raised case in the literature is that saving and investment 
might react in a similar fashion to third economic forces other than financial constraints 
(see for example Payne (2005), and Loayza et al. (2000) and Serven (2002) on the 
empirics of private saving and investment, respectively). As an illustration, a higher 
GDP growth rate is likely to simultaneously increase current saving and investment. 
                                                 
1
 Hubbard (1998) extensively reviews the literature and cites several sources of disagreement over the 
validity of the test, some of them along the same lines as those against the Feldstein-Horioka test. But as 
in the latter case,  this test has been resilient to criticism and is still widely used in finance. 
 
2
 For the most part, studies on national and corporate financial constraints do not take into account wealth 
stocks. This might give rise to misleading conclusions, as a non significant correlation of investment and 
saving may be due to fluid access to credit and/or the use of accumulated financial assets. However, we 
will not pursue this issue throughout the paper. 
Likewise, as governments may set narrow targets of current account imbalances, 
measures may be in place to maintain a tight correlation of saving and investment by, 
say, modifying interest rates or the fiscal balance.  
 
b. Intertemporal budget constraint. In order to meet this budget constraint, saving and 
investment should be equal to each other in the long run, but not necessarily in the short 
run. 
 
This paper makes an original contribution to the FH literature by exploring the 
institutional sector dimension in OECD countries. The mounting work on this puzzle 
has so far neglected the implications of the household, corporate and government 
components of the national saving and investment rates.
3
 Why this research angle is of 
utmost relevance comes from the very fact that countries are just abstract entities. 
Actually, those who engaged (or not) in financial relations with the rest of the world and 
with each other are the households, the corporations, and the government. To draw any 
sound policy advice on financial openness, a clear understanding of sectoral behavior is 
called for. For instance, from an economic growth perspective, a financially-constrained 
corporate sector is more pervasive than the household or the government sector going 
through such situation; on the contrary, financial stability would likely be less at risk 
with a financially-constrained government sector, especially in developing economies. 
Equally important, the comparison between the national β coefficient and the sectoral β 
coefficients provides a nice test of international vis-à-vis intranational financial 
constraints, allowing to have a better grasp about how financial markets work within 
countries by taking a closer look at intersectoral flows.  
 
Beyond the data-related value added, our work advances in other fronts, especially in 
tackling the caveats cited above. First, we test the robustness of our results by using 
different panel data techniques and by accounting for common and fiscal factors 
affecting saving and investment. Second, we split the sample into current account 
deficits and surpluses to unveil possible asymmetries. Finally, we employ novel 
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 The only (at least to our knowledge) two papers that test FH paying attention to sectoral decomposition 
reach conflicting results. Argimon and Roldan (1994) investigate the casual relationship between the 
saving-investment gaps of the government and the private sector in European countries over 1960-1988 
without finding any connection. However, Iwamoto and van Wincoop (2000) report negative correlations 
of more than 80% for OECD countries in 1975-1990.  
dynamic panel data estimators to distinguish long- and short-run investment-saving 
comovements.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 1, we describe our database and 
highlight some stylized facts. In Section 2, we run our baseline national and sectoral 
Feldstein-Horioka regressions, with and without controlling for potential common 
factors. A fiscal behavior approach is put forward in Section 3 to interpret our findings, 
which are further dissected by separating deficit and surplus years in Section 4. The 
distinction between long-run and short-run sensitivity of investment to saving is 
discussed in Section 5. Some conclusions close.  
 
Section 1: Stylized Observations 
 
Before going into the econometrics, several patterns in the series (in all cases, gross 
rates to GDP) involved will be underlined, some of which will help rationalize later 
findings. Tables 1 to 8 report country averages and standard deviations of the saving, 
investment and current account rates to GDP at the national and sectoral levels. The 
following facts stand out:  
 
(i) In spite of being a rather homogeneous set of countries, pronounced differences in 
investment and saving rates strike the eye, both for national and sectoral figures. For 
example, the national saving rate ranges from 15.7% in the UK to 32.6% in Korea and 
31.2% in Switzerland. Incidentally, the dispersion is higher in saving than in investment 
rates; 
 
(ii) As highlighted in Bebczuk and Schmidt-Hebbel (2006), the corporate sector 
generates on average more saving than any other sector in the economy, although in 6 
out of the 16 countries it is the household saving the one leading the saving statistics. 
On the investment side, the corporate sector contributes with the bulk of the national 
investment (57.9%), although the household and government sectors are responsible for 
significant fractions (28.7% and 13.4%). This defies the usual textbook claim that 
households save and businesses invest, with the financial system acting as the 
intermediary of funds; 
 
(iii) The average national current account is just 0.6%, but, again, huge differences 
across countries are found. The range goes from –4.4% in Australia to 7.6% in 
Switzerland. These figures indicate that foreign saving finances a marginal portion of 
domestic saving (2.4% on average and a maximum of 17.5% in Australia); 
 
(iv) Current accounts behave quite differently across sectors. Households have an 
average surplus of 3.4% of GDP (with only 3 deficit countries), while corporations and 
governments display deficits of 1.6% and 1.2% respectively;  
 
(v) Elemental macroeconomic theory leads us to expect that the current account is more 
volatile than both consumption and investment, based on the role of shock absorber of 
the current account under capital mobility. Strikingly, we find in the sample that the 
current account is roughly as volatile as the saving rate in national and sectoral data, and 
that the saving rate is on average at least as volatile as the investment rate, even though 
this is not a regularity on a country-by-country basis (see Fanelli (2005a, 2005b) for a 
thorough discussion on volatility in macroeconomic variables).
4
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 It could be argued that it is private saving and investment what should be looked at, as stated by the 
corporate veil literature. Nevertheless, results do not change qualitatively.  
  
 
Table 1 Table 2
Gross National Saving and Investment to GDP: Gross Household Saving and Investment to GDP:
Country Averages Country Averages
Country S I S-I Country S I S-I
Belgium 23.7 20.1 3.7 Belgium 11.7 5.7 6.0
UK 15.7 17.9 -2.1 UK 5.3 4.3 1.0
Switzerland 31.2 23.6 7.6 Switzerland 11.2 5.9 5.3
Italy 21.2 21.4 -0.2 Italy 19.3 7.9 11.5
Japan 31.0 29.0 2.0 Japan 13.2 6.8 6.3
Norway 28.3 24.6 3.7 Norway 5.3 5.9 -0.7
US 17.2 19.2 -2.0 US 8.5 7.2 1.4
Netherlands 25.0 21.4 3.6 Netherlands 10.7 6.0 4.7
Spain 21.0 22.5 -1.5 Spain 7.9 5.5 2.4
Finland 24.1 23.8 0.2 Finland 5.9 7.1 -1.1
Germany 20.7 21.0 -0.3 Germany 11.1 7.5 3.6
Australia 20.8 25.1 -4.4 Australia 11.6 9.8 1.8
Denmark 19.3 19.8 -0.5 Denmark 3.8 4.4 -0.6
France 20.2 20.5 -0.3 France 9.8 6.7 3.1
Canada 20.5 21.7 -1.1 Canada 10.4 6.4 4.0
Korea 32.6 32.1 0.5 Korea 13.1 6.8 6.3
Average 23.3 22.7 0.6 Average 9.9 6.5 3.4
St. Dev. 5.1 3.7 2.9 St. Dev. 3.8 1.3 3.3
Table 3 Table 4
Gross Corporate Saving and Investment to GDP: Gross Government Saving and Investment to GDP:
Country Averages Country Averages
Country S I S-I Country S I S-I
Belgium 14.1 12.4 1.8 Belgium -2.1 2.0 -4.1
UK 10.3 11.7 -1.4 UK 0.1 1.9 -1.8
Switzerland 17.4 14.6 2.8 Switzerland 2.6 3.1 -0.5
Italy 6.1 10.7 -4.5 Italy -4.2 2.9 -7.1
Japan 14.3 16.8 -2.5 Japan 3.5 5.4 -1.9
Norway 14.2 15.3 -1.1 Norway 8.8 3.4 5.4
US 9.2 9.6 -0.4 US -0.5 2.5 -3.0
Netherlands 10.7 12.1 -1.4 Netherlands 3.6 3.2 0.4
Spain 12.2 13.5 -1.3 Spain 0.9 3.5 -2.6
Finland 12.1 13.4 -1.3 Finland 6.1 3.4 2.6
Germany 9.3 11.4 -2.1 Germany 0.3 2.1 -1.8
Australia 8.3 12.3 -4.0 Australia 0.9 3.1 -2.2
Denmark 14.6 13.5 1.1 Denmark 0.9 1.9 -1.0
France 9.1 10.7 -1.6 France 1.2 3.1 -1.9
Canada 10.3 12.2 -2.0 Canada -0.1 3.0 -3.1
Korea 11.9 20.5 -8.6 Korea 7.6 4.8 2.8
Average 11.5 13.2 -1.6 Average 1.9 3.1 -1.2
St. Dev. 2.9 2.7 2.6 St. Dev. 3.4 1.0 3.0
Coverage: Belgium, 1985-2003; UK, 1987-2003; Switzerland, 1990-2002; Italy, 1980-2003; Japan, 1980-2002; 
Norway, 1978-2003; US, 1970-2003; Netherlands, 1980-2003; Spain, 1981-2003; Finland, 1975-2003; Germany, 1991-2003; 
Australia, 1970-2003; Denmark, 1981-2003; France, 1978-2003; Canada, 1970-2003; Korea, 1975-2003.
Source: OECD (www.sourceoecd.org)
Table 5 Table 6
Gross National Saving and Investment to GDP: Gross Household Saving and Investment to GDP:
Standard Deviation of Country Rates Standard Deviation of Country Rates
Country S I S-I Country S I S-I
Belgium 2.4 1.4 1.8 Belgium 1.6 0.7 1.7
UK 1.2 1.8 1.3 UK 1.7 0.6 2.2
Switzerland 1.9 2.6 2.7 Switzerland 0.7 0.7 1.1
Italy 1.7 2.5 1.6 Italy 5.7 1.2 4.8
Japan 2.4 2.4 1.0 Japan 2.2 1.1 1.4
Norway 3.4 3.9 5.7 Norway 1.5 1.9 2.7
US 2.1 1.5 1.3 US 2.3 0.9 2.2
Netherlands 1.7 1.3 1.5 Netherlands 1.5 0.7 2.1
Spain 1.6 2.0 1.7 Spain 0.9 0.7 1.3
Finland 3.5 5.0 4.3 Finland 1.6 2.0 2.4
Germany 1.0 2.1 1.3 Germany 0.5 0.6 0.9
Australia 3.0 2.5 1.7 Australia 3.8 1.4 3.3
Denmark 2.5 1.8 2.5 Denmark 2.0 0.8 2.4
France 1.8 1.9 1.7 France 1.4 1.3 1.5
Canada 2.7 2.3 2.0 Canada 3.3 0.8 3.1
Korea 5.1 4.0 4.7 Korea 4.0 2.0 3.2
Average 2.4 2.4 2.3 Average 2.2 1.1 2.3
Table 7 Table 8
Gross Corporate Saving and Investment to GDP: Gross Government Saving and Investment to GDP:
Standard Deviation of Country Rates Standard Deviation of Country Rates
Country S I S-I Country S I S-I
Belgium 1.5 1.1 1.2 Belgium 3.4 0.4 3.6
UK 1.7 1.4 2.4 UK 2.6 0.5 2.9
Switzerland 1.5 1.7 2.0 Switzerland 1.4 0.4 1.5
Italy 1.7 1.0 2.4 Italy 3.4 0.5 3.9
Japan 2.0 1.7 3.2 Japan 2.7 0.6 2.8
Norway 1.0 2.3 2.0 Norway 3.8 0.5 4.1
US 0.8 1.0 1.1 US 2.0 0.2 1.9
Netherlands 1.5 1.2 1.5 Netherlands 3.6 0.3 3.7
Spain 1.3 1.3 1.9 Spain 1.9 0.6 2.0
Finland 3.3 2.9 4.9 Finland 4.2 0.4 4.1
Germany 0.8 1.3 1.4 Germany 0.9 0.5 0.7
Australia 1.8 1.4 2.4 Australia 2.1 0.7 2.2
Denmark 2.0 1.5 2.4 Denmark 2.8 0.3 3.0
France 1.7 1.0 2.0 France 1.8 0.3 1.8
Canada 2.0 1.5 2.5 Canada 3.3 0.5 3.3
Korea 1.9 2.7 3.3 Korea 2.2 0.7 1.8
Average 1.7 1.6 2.3 Average 2.6 0.5 2.7
Coverage: Belgium, 1985-2003; UK, 1987-2003; Switzerland, 1990-2002; Italy, 1980-2003; Japan, 1980-2002; 
Norway, 1978-2003; US, 1970-2003; Netherlands, 1980-2003; Spain, 1981-2003; Finland, 1975-2003; Germany, 1991-2003; 
Australia, 1970-2003; Denmark, 1981-2003; France, 1978-2003; Canada, 1970-2003; Korea, 1975-2003.
Source: OECD (www.sourceoecd.org)
Section 2: Baseline Econometric Results 
 
We start by running the FH equation for national investment and saving, as well as for 
household, corporate and government figures, using three panel data techniques: pooled 
OLS, Random Effects, and Fixed Effects. The results presented in Table 9 point 
towards a national coefficient ranging between 0.43 and 0.60, much in line with 
previous studies.
5
 Our main interest, though, are the sectoral coefficients, and they are 
consistently lower than the national one. The household FH coefficient is always 
significant and varies from 0.15 to 0.17. The corporate and government coefficients are 
not significantly positive, except in the pooled OLS specification. However, a Chow test 
indicates that the latter method is inconsistent vis-à-vis Fixed Effects, implying that the 
intercept homogeneity constraint is rejected, so we will disregard the pooled model and 
focus instead in the other estimators from now on.
6
 Consequently, we are able to claim 
that the household coefficient is about one third of the national one, and that the positive 
investment-saving correlation disappears at the corporate and government levels.  
 
Table 9 
Baseline National and Sectoral Feldstein-Horioka Regressions 
 
 National Household Corporate Government 
Pooled OLS 0.60 
(16.45)*** 
0.173 
(9.29)*** 
0.385 
(10.4)*** 
0.089 
(7.84)*** 
Random Effects 0.496 
(11.88)*** 
0.15 
(6.87)*** 
-0.028 
(-0.6) 
-0.008 
(-0.92) 
Fixed Effects 0.479 
(10.62)*** 
0.146 
(6.4)*** 
-0.059 
(-1.21) 
-0.011 
(-1.33) 
  
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, FH exercises are sometimes said to be driven by the 
existence of common factors explaining saving and investment and not by imperfect 
capital mobility. To put our results to the test, we will follow two procedures. The first 
one builds on Iwamoto and van Wincoop (2000), who perform a conditional FH test for 
OECD countries and Japanese regions to eliminate usual suspects that may jointly shape 
saving and investment decisions, and then use the unexplained residuals of the 
corresponding regressions to estimate a common-factor-free FH coefficient. The 
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 For example, Boyreau and Wei (2004) obtain for the whole, balanced OECD sample an estimate of 0.71 
in 1960-1977 and 0.46 for 1978-2001.  
6
 Hausman tests were unconclusive regarding the choice between random and fixed effects across the 
different regressions. However, as the coefficients are quite similar to each other, this does not represent a 
serious dilemma. 
estimated β become insignificantly different from zero in their time-series exercises as 
such controls are entered. While an ingenious procedure, it is disputable whether to 
attribute the weakening of the saving-investment relationship to a successful elimination 
of the endogeneity bias or to the mere introduction of multicollinearity. Financial 
constraints are not directly observable, and there is no bullet-proof method to make sure 
the β is not biased as a result of misspecification –financial constraints may be 
correlated with some of the common factors. For example, a temporary productivity 
shock tends to increase both saving and investment. As a result, we are tempted to 
control for, say, the GDP growth rate. However, the macroeconomic literature states 
that the excess sensitivity of saving and investment to current GDP growth may well be 
explained also by myopia or financial constraints. In the latter case, the unexplained 
residuals will not fully capture the financial constraint component that was intended to 
isolate in the first place, probably reducing the significance of the estimated coefficient 
β. Nonetheless, as far as the estimated coefficients do not change in response to the 
inclusion of new controls in both sides of the equation, the baseline results should look 
more reliable.  
 
After demeaning annual data substracting annual cross-country averages –which is 
equivalent to introducing time dummy variables but preserves degrees of freedom- as a 
means of eliminating common international systemic factors, we controlled both 
investment and saving for GDP growth, the inflation rate and per capita GDP and used 
the resulting residuals to compute the FH coefficient, yielding the estimates shown in 
Table 10. Previous results in this Section stay the same to a great extent, with the 
exception of the government coefficient that becomes significant, but still below a value 
of 0.05. 
 
Table 10 
Conditional FH Tests 
 
 National Household Corporate Government 
Random Effects 0.482 
(13.27)*** 
0.126 
(5.41)*** 
0.055 
(1.13) 
0.049 
(4.8)*** 
Fixed Effects 0.462 
(11.49)*** 
0.118 
(4.77)*** 
0.01 
(0.21) 
0.046 
(4.5)*** 
 
 
Yet another test of robustness is to employ internal instruments by applying the GMM 
system technique on both the unconditional and the conditional regressions as a way of 
dealing with the potential endogeneity of saving –see the Annex for a description of this 
method.
7
 Again, no noteworthy change is observed, as revealed by Table 11:
8
 
 
Table 11 
GMM System FH Estimates 
 
 National Household Corporate Government 
Unconditional 
FH coefficient 
0.543 
(4.02)*** 
0.136 
(1.00) 
0.21 
(0.92) 
-0.054 
(-1.48) 
Conditional FH 
coefficient 
0.433 
(3.25)*** 
0.163 
(2.18)** 
-0.241 
(-2.08)** 
-0.067 
(-2.39)** 
 
After discarding the presence of spurious correlations, we are prepared to concentrate 
ourselves on a new puzzle within the FH puzzle, as the marked contrast between the 
national and sectoral results begs some interpretation. 
 
 
Section 3: Fiscal behavior and the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle 
 
Is it sensible to expect the national FH coefficient to be higher than sectoral 
coefficients? Since the interaction between the private and the public sector is key to 
approach this question, we will do some elementary algebra to shed light on this 
finding. FH states that si β= , where i and s are the investment and saving rates, 
respectively, and β is the FH coefficient. As national investment can be expressed as 
gp
iii += , that is, the sum of private and public investment, and that there exist 
sectoral FH relationships of the form 
ppp
si β=  and 
ggg
si β= , the nacional FH 
coefficient can be written as )/()/( ssss
ggpp
βββ += , namely, a weighted average 
of sectoral coefficients, with the weights being the proportions in national saving. This 
gives an intuitive answer that clashes with the empirical results: a country cannot be 
more financially-constrained than their domestic institutional sectors.  
 
                                                 
7
 We used the second to the sixth lags as instruments in the GMM exercises conducted throughout the 
paper. Results were in general (but not always) robust to changes in the lag structure. Sargan and first- 
and second-order autocorrelation tests indicate that no specification problems were present.  
8
 Actually, the irrelevance of common factors should not come as a total surprise. Recalling that past 
studies encountered that FH coefficients declined in a noticeable way over time, the common factor 
rationale should figure out what theory supports such time-varying influence of third variables. 
We propose a fiscal-related explanation for coexistence of high national and low 
sectoral FH coefficients. Suppose that the government aims to target the national current 
account by running a surplus (deficit) every time the private sector runs a deficit 
(surplus), following the rule )(
ppgg
isais −=− , where a≤0 –a=-1 implies that the 
target is a balanced current account. Redefining the FH equation as sis )1( β−=−  
and inserting the fiscal rule and the private sector FH equation 
ppp
si β= , β equals 
[ ]ssa
pp
/)1)(1(1 ββ −+−= . Note for any given value of 
p
β , the lower a, the 
higher β . As an extreme example, if 1−=a , then 1=β  even with 0=
p
β , a case in 
which, whatever imbalance the private sector runs, the public sector fully offsets it so as 
to reach a nil current account and thus a perfect national investment-saving correlation.  
 
In order to assess how well this story fits the data, we ran a regression of the public on 
the household and corporate current accounts. As apparent from Table 12, a negative 
and strong correlation exists in both cases, with a stronger reaction to household vis-à-
vis corporate imbalances, lending support to the hypothesis that the national positive FH 
coefficient comes from fiscal current account targeting rather than from imperfect 
capital mobility.  
 
It might be argued that the relationship has to be negative under no capital mobility, as 
the sum of the sectoral current accounts must be zero. But this is not the case in this 
sample. Moreover, if that were the case, the R-squared should be close to one, and is 
actually around 0.4. Additionally, when the private sector is broken down into 
corporations and households, the sign is not restricted to be negative in both cases even 
under no capital mobility. Another possible criticism is that the relationship may go the 
other way around, from public to private saving, by invoking partial or full Ricardian 
equivalence.  After some simple regression analysis, we concluded that government 
saving is more sensitive to private investment than to saving, so Ricardian equivalence 
does not drive our results –alongside, public investment is much less responsive to 
private sector imbalances.
9
 All this boils down into the high volatility of the public 
                                                 
9
 We ran the following regressions: (a) Government Saving = -4.3 –0.44 Private Saving + 0.79 Private 
Investment and (b) Government Investment = -0.79 –0.06 Private Saving + 0.14 Private Investment. All 
coefficients were highly significant. The main message from these exercises are that (i) the current 
current account and its saving rate found in Section 1, accompanied by the relative 
stability of its investment rate. On top of this, as shown in the last row of Table 12, we 
tackled the alleged simultaneity of the private and public current accounts through a 
GMM system estimator, without perceiving worth mentioning changes.  
 
Table 12 
Fiscal Response to Private Sector Current Account Imbalances 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Government Current Account 
Corporate  
Current Account 
Household 
Current Account 
Random Effects -0.362 
(-8.33)*** 
-0.712 
(-16.76)*** 
Fixed Effects -0.362 
(-8.17)*** 
-0.717 
(-16.48)*** 
GMM System -0.532 
(-4.12)*** 
-0.833 
(-4.31)*** 
 
 
We additionally investigate whether the government reacts symmetrically to household 
and corporate deficits and surpluses. In principle, we should expect a stronger response 
to deficits, as they are more likely to threaten macroeconomic stability than surpluses in 
a world of imperfect international capital markets. Our findings, reported in Table 13, 
contradict this hypothesis, once we witness that the countervailing effect is much higher 
for surpluses than for deficits. A political economy argument can be advanced: private 
deficits must be compensated with public surpluses, and governments often face 
political and social constraints to reduce expenditures and raise taxes –furthermore, 
financial crisis might not be such a central concern in mature economies as in emerging 
ones. Conversely, private surpluses easily allow governments to pursue expansionary 
policies (more spending and less taxes). Besides, the larger overall coefficient on 
household current account seems to be explained by the high sensitivity to surpluses 
(above 0.8) –the reaction to deficits is similar for both corporate and household (about 
0.35 under random and fixed effects, and non-significant under GMM system). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
account targeting is done mostly through changes in public saving rather than investment, but  (ii) 
government saving responds more strongly to private investment than to private saving. 
  
 
 
Table 13 
Fiscal Response to Private Sector Current Account Deficits and Surpluses 
 
 Corporate 
Current 
Account 
(Deficit) 
Corporate 
Current 
Account 
(Surplus) 
Household 
Current 
Account 
(Deficit) 
 
Household 
Current 
Account 
(Surplus) 
Random 
Effects 
-0.352 
(-5.79)*** 
-0.482 
(-4.05)*** 
-0.388 
(-3.15)*** 
-0.794 
(-14.99)*** 
Fixed Effects -0.342 
(-5.55)*** 
-0.511 
(-4.24)*** 
-0.378 
(-3.06)*** 
-0.804 
(-14.85)*** 
GMM 
System 
-0.292 
(-1.27) 
-0.995 
(-4.51)*** 
-0.487 
(-1.26) 
-0.95 
(-4.73)*** 
 
 
An additional research question is whether institutional sectors seem a priori financially 
unconstrained because they are able to easily tap international capital markets (high 
international capital mobility) or because they finance each other through internal 
capital markets (high domestic capital mobility). Since we do not have information on 
intersectoral financial flows, we are forced to conjecture. Regarding household and 
corporate current accounts, the fact that the former is typically positive and the latter 
negative suggests that well-functioning internal capital markets are probably behind the 
low estimates of hβ and cβ .10 We are less confident, though, that they have anything to 
do with financial flows with the public sector as, in spite of its effort to smooth external 
imbalances, the public sector normally exhibits deficits.
11
  
 
In sum, we are inclined to believe, resting on our battery of FH tests, that OECD 
countries do not appear to face neither international financial constraints (as the positive 
national coefficients are just caused by a fiscal current account targeting policy) nor 
domestic financial constraints (as most sectoral FH coefficients are low and/or non- 
                                                 
10
 It could be the case that households channel their surpluses to foreign markets, but the strong (yet 
declining) financial home bias documented in numerous studies (see Lewis (1999)) leads to discard this 
possibility.  
11
 Furthermore, unlike corporate and, especially, household surpluses, fiscal surpluses do not necessarily 
transform themselves into domestic private sector financing via the financial system, as far as those funds 
are often used to building up the stock of official net foreign assets. 
significant).
12
 However, as shown next, even this conclusion lends itself to further 
controversy.  
 
 
Section 4: Deficits, Surpluses, and the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle 
 
 
The basic notion behind FH is that investment and saving move in tandem because the 
country or sector cannot invest beyond the amount of own resources it disposes of. This 
opens up the possibility of asymmetric correlations under current account deficits and 
surpluses. We should expect that investment would not deviate much from saving when 
facing a deficit under less-than-full capital mobility, but there is no reason to predict the 
same close relationship under a surplus, as saving can be as much larger than 
investment as desired.
13
 To test the hypothesis, we created two annual dummy variables, 
with value 1 if a current account deficit (surplus) is observed, and 0 otherwise, which 
we then interacted with the saving rate. A positive and larger coefficient is expected on 
the Deficit vis-à-vis the Surplus resulting explanatory variables. Table 14 shows the 
estimates obtained by the same methods used in earlier sections, confirming our belief: 
FH correlations are in general much stronger for deficit than for surplus years –although 
the coefficient on corporate deficits is not significant in the GMM regression. As in 
previous sections, we find higher values at the national level vis-à-vis sectoral levels 
and, once again, the government sector happens to yield non-positive correlations in all 
cases.  
 
Nevertheless, the exercise raises the question as to why some sectoral coefficients 
become significant and larger compared with the baseline ones, and not only for the 
Deficit variable but also for the Surplus variable. For the Deficit variable, the 
correlation climbs to around 0.5 for households and to 0.3 for corporations, while for 
the Surplus variable, it reaches about 0.2 for households but stays non-significant for 
corporations (save for the significant 0.1 with the random effects estimation). Scatter 
plots, in Charts 1 through 12, of sectoral investment and saving for Deficit, Surplus and 
                                                 
12
 Incidentally, the high degree of domestic capital mobility is consistent with the nil or negative estimates 
found in most intranational, provincial-level FH studies (see Hericourt and Maurel (2005) for a survey). 
13
 Of course, the latter assertion relies on the realistic assumption that there are no capital controls 
limiting financial investment for surplus units, which became the predominant case in the sample from 
the early 1970s, when our sample begins –until then, controls were in place in some countries for 
investments abroad. 
total figures provide us with a partial clue to disentangle this striking fact.
14
 From visual 
inspection, we find that, as expected, many Deficit values (Surplus values) appear in the 
upper left (lower right) quadrant, so that the goodness of fit is stronger when they are 
taken as separate explanatory variables. But this is not just a misleading optical illusion, 
but an interesting economic phenomenon that urges us to partially revise our earlier 
results and to pinpoint three outcomes. First, the recovered significance of the FH 
correlation for deficit figures implies that financial constraints do seem to exist at the 
end of the day for the household and corporate sectors every time investment exceeds 
saving. Even though the estimates are in the lower bound within the empirical FH 
literature, they are still far from negligible. Furthermore, the higher correlation for 
household vis-à-vis corporations looks a priori reasonable, once one should believe the 
average household to be more financially constrained than the average corporation 
because of differences in size, age, and available collateral, all of which have a bearing 
on intermediation costs and the extent of informational asymmetries. These frictions 
become especially acute in international borrowing, where exchange rate uncertainty, 
exacerbated informational problems, and judicial and institutional barriers are at play –
indeed, households rarely access international credit markets. 
  
The second and more intricate fact is the upward slopping cloud of points for household 
surplus values, which is certainly not what the standard theory predicts regarding the 
separation of investment and saving decisions in the absence of financial constraints. 
Even though, as mentioned above, the correlation coefficient is rather low, it is highly 
significant and robust, thus deserving some brief analysis. The obvious candidate for 
explaining this is, once more, the influence of common factors on saving and 
investment, but we can quickly reject it after recalling that common factors did not 
appear to drive our baseline results. Anyway, we repeated the procedure of Section 2 
and ran individual regressions of investment and saving on GDP growth, the inflation 
rate and per capita GDP for deficit observations, on one hand, and for surplus 
observations, on the other hand, and then computed the FH coefficient for the 
corresponding residuals. Had the surplus coefficient dropped significantly, there would 
have been some ground to blame common factors for the positive correlation in surplus 
                                                 
14
 Recall that the Deficit and Surplus variables are the interaction of saving rates with dummies variables. 
The observations lined up along the vertical axis in sectoral graphs correspond to zero values of such 
dummies. 
times, but the (unreported) results were similar to the previous ones. A plausible 
alternative rationale is that, in simultaneously deciding saving and investment, each 
sector would be trying not to run excessive surpluses. After all, sacrificing current 
consumption pays off as long as the ensuing wealth accumulation allows economic 
units to avoid undesirable fluctuations in future consumption and investment. In this 
view, economic agents likely set an optimal rate of wealth accumulation based, among 
other factors, on their current wealth stocks, their forecasted income volatility, and their 
attitude towards risk. Once reached this optimal level, agents would prefer raising their 
consumption rather than their wealth, limiting their current account surpluses and 
strengthening the investment-saving correlation. 
  
Finally, it catches the eye that national FH correlations increase compared to the 
baseline ones, owing to the same splitting just discussed. But the higher correlation for 
deficit (about 0.75) vis-à-vis surplus observations (about 0.55) appears at odds with the 
fiscal view put forward in Section 3. Our claim was that the national FH coefficient was 
expected to be larger the higher the negative correlation of public and private current 
accounts. Since the fiscal compensation coefficient was seen to be higher for private 
surpluses than for deficits, we would expect a higher coefficient in the former case.
15
  
However, we should recall that now, unlike the baseline ones, some sectoral FH 
correlations are significantly positive. As this is especially true for deficit years, this 
pushes up the national FH coefficient, thus partially counterbalancing the fiscal effect. 
 
Table 14 
FH Correlations for Deficit and Surplus Years 
 
 Random Effects Fixed Effects GMM System 
National  
(Deficit) 
0.742 
(22.92)*** 
0.695 
(19.89)*** 
0.766 
(9.75)*** 
National 
(Surplus) 
0.558 
(18.72)*** 
0.513 
(15.59)*** 
0.539 
(7.85)*** 
Household 
(Deficit) 
0.536 
(11.32)*** 
0.524 
(10.9)*** 
0.456 
(1.27) 
Household 
(Surplus) 
0.221 
(10.37)*** 
0.216 
(9.69)*** 
0.192 
(2.6)** 
Corporate 
(Deficit) 
0.301 
(5.93)*** 
0.249 
(4.82)*** 
0.344 
(2.32)** 
Corporate  0.101 0.057 0.072 
                                                 
15
 For the private sector as a whole, the fiscal reaction coefficients are -0.23 for private deficits and -0.82 
for surpluses. 
(Surplus) (2.35)** (1.28) (0.77) 
Government 
(Deficit) 
-0.004 
(-0.27) 
-0.007 
(-0.52) 
-0.04 
(-1.18) 
Goverment 
(Surplus) 
-0.01 
(-0.97) 
-0.014 
(-1.3) 
-0.066 
(-6.2)*** 
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Section 5: Intertemporal Budget Constraint and the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle 
 
 
Perhaps the most popular explanation for the strong correlation between saving and 
investment is that a country must meet its budget constraint in the long run, so current 
account deficits (surpluses) will be compensated by future surpluses (deficits). We 
study this issue by looking at the total and sectoral investment-saving relationships in 
the long- and short-run using the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) methodology, adopting a 
ARDL (1,1) structure.
16
  This methodology is appealing because it enables to 
distinguish long-run and short-run effects in panel data, testing at the same time whether 
there is long-run homogeneity across units while maintaining short-run country 
heterogeneity. We offer additional details on this technique in the context of our present 
application in the Annex. We will work with unconditional Feldstein-Horioka 
regressions because the core of the argument revolves around the observed levels of 
investment and saving, no matter what underlying factors explain them. 
 
The regression output appears in Table 15. Regarding total investment and saving, our 
first finding is that the long-run relationship is 0.75, with a lower short-run response of 
0.25. The negative error correction term of 0.29 ensures the stability of the model and 
shows that half of the adjustment takes place in just 2.4 years.
17
 Does the rejection of 
the hypothesis that the long-run coefficient is equal to 1 immediately mean that the 
intertemporal budget constraint is not satisfied? Our answer is no, as the notion of long 
run is somewhat arbitrary for a country, whose planning horizon is quite long. 
Particularly, for industrial countries, current account imbalances are observed for 
extended periods of time.
18
 In the end, the need to have a balanced current account over 
rather short periods obeys to reputational considerations in international markets, which 
affect more heavily developing countries. At any rate, our sample does not look long 
enough to expect a one-to-one relationship between saving and investment in OECD 
countries.  It must also be noted that the fact that the coefficient is not above 1 
guarantees that the stock of external debt does not grow unboundedly.  
 
                                                 
16
 Results were not sensitive to the change in the lag structure. 
17
 Also using PMG, Pelgrin and Schich (2004) find for a balanced sample of  20 OECD countries a long-
run coefficient of 0.93 for 1960-1999 and 0.92 for 1970-1999, with an error correction estimate of -0.33 
in both cases and short-run effects of 0.25 and 0.22. 
All the sectoral long-run results are well below 1, with the corporate sector in the upper 
limit (0.58) and the household and government sectors in the lower one (0.078 and 
0.062, respectively). In all cases, the error correction term is negative, as surprisingly 
are the short-run impacts. According to the Hausman test, the long-run parameter 
homogeneity cannot statistically be rejected in any of the equations, even though 
country-specific short-run responses vary in a noticeable fashion.
19
 This homogeneity 
constraint explains the efficiency gains of the PMG over the MG reflected in the lower 
standard deviations of the estimates. 
 
At this point we are concerned about the different long-run coefficient across sectors. 
For the non-significant government coefficient, the most sensible motive is that 
sovereign borrowers, especially in developed countries, enjoy a reputational and tax-
levying advantage over private borrowers in local and foreign capital markets, which 
allows them to issue debt with much longer maturities and easy rollover. As for the 
difference between the corporate and the household sector, our main hypothesis goes 
along the same lines as those sketched in Section 4: the time frame to meet the 
intertemporal budget constraint is different for deficit and surplus economic units. Our 
previous analysis documented that financial constraints do arise once investment 
exceeds saving. In our sample, households are typically surplus units and corporations 
are deficit units.
20
 In this light, the corporate sector is forced to, at least partially, repay 
its debt in the long-run, creating a positive nexus between investment and saving. The 
surplus household sector, on the contrary, is in position to decide more freely its saving 
and investment rates not only in the short- but also in the long-run.
21
 A complementary 
reason that warrants the less-than-unitary coefficient is an aggregation issue: while the 
government is both a sector and a legal unit per se, there are millions of corporations 
and households. As a result, even though each of them may satisfy their own budget 
constraints, the sector as a whole may look as if not. In a simplistic example, suppose 
non-overlapping corporations living each just one period. At the end of the first period, 
                                                                                                                                               
18
 A case in point, among others, is Australia, whose current account has been strongly negative in all but 
18 years since 1861 (see Cashin and Wickham (1998)). 
19
 For space reasons, the short-run coefficients are not reported, but are available from the authors upon 
request.  
20
 Over the total sample of 390 observations, a current account deficit was recorded in 55 cases (14.1%) 
for households and in 276 cases (70.8%) for corporations. 
21
 Of course, in the long-run (whatever long-run means in our intertemporal problem) households have to 
satisfy their transversality condition (not leaving unconsumed wealth), unless bequests or other motives 
cause them to deviate from it. 
the first company pays its debt and ceases to exist, but simultaneously the second one 
starts up and raises debt. Going on and on, corporate debt as a whole will not 
necessarily go down, regardless of the fact that each individual company respects its 
budget constraint in the short-run.
22
 In our particular empirical application, this 
atomization blurs to some extent the long-run analysis on the household and corporate 
sectors.  
 
Of importance here is also to underline that the fiscal view is still valid here: if the 
government targets the current account –as advanced in Section 3-, then the long-run 
national coefficient may be high even if the country is not required to meet its 
intertemporal budget constraint.
23
 In consequence, the presence of a national coefficient 
higher than each and every sectoral long-run FH coefficient can be interpreted as before, 
with the additional upward influence of the high and positive corporate sector 
coefficient.  
 
To close, it is worth noting that the cross-section regressions, a crude approximation to 
the long-run relationship, yield estimates of 0.59, 0.51, 0.19 and 0.16 for the national, 
corporate, household and government equations, somewhat similar to the PMG long-run  
coefficients of 0.75, 0.58, 0.078 and 0.062.
                                                 
22
 The usually growing levels of domestic credit to the private sector in most countries is an eloquent 
piece of evidence of this kind of heterogeneity at the interior of the corporate and household sectors. 
23
 But this does not work the other way around, as a high long-run coefficient does not necessarily imply 
a high short-run coefficient. 
 
Table 15: Feldstein-Horioka Sectoral Regressions (Pooled Mean Group) 
 
 Pooled Mean 
Group 
Mean Group Hausman Test 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Dynamic 
Fixed Effects 
Total Saving Rate     
Long-Run Coefficient 
(Total Saving) 
0.750 
(10.021)*** 
1.052 
(4.488)*** 
1.84 
(0.17) 
0.709 
(4.583)*** 
Error Correction 
Coefficient 
-0.291 
(-7.431)*** 
-0.337 
(-9.950)*** 
 -0.278 
(-6.361)*** 
Short-Run Coefficient  
(∆ Total Saving) 
0.253 
(2.510)** 
0.193 
(2.138)** 
 0.131 
(1.009) 
Constant 1.437 
(3.998)*** 
0.491 
(0.363) 
  
Household Saving Rate     
Long-Run Coefficient 
(Household Saving) 
0.078 
(2.233)** 
-0.901 
(-1.176) 
2.75 
(0.10) 
0.394 
(1.12) 
Error Correction 
Coefficient 
-0.229 
(-5.105)*** 
-0.261 
(-5.517)*** 
 -0.159 
(-5.841)*** 
Short-Run Coefficient  
(∆ Household Saving) 
-0.129 
(-1.382) 
-0.106 
(-1.186) 
 0.499 
(3.142)*** 
Constant 1.364 
(3.831)*** 
1.552 
(4.847)*** 
  
No. of Countries 16 16  16 
No. of Observations 374 374  374 
Note:  
T Statistic in parenthesis ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 1%. 
 
 
 Table 15: Feldstein-Horioka Sectoral Regressions (Pooled Mean Group) (Cont.) 
 
 Pooled Mean 
Group 
Mean Group Hausman Test 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Dynamic 
Fixed Effects 
Corporate Investment 
Rate 
    
Long-Run Coefficient 
(Corporate Saving) 
0.585 
(5.451)*** 
6.286 
(1.168) 
1.12 
(0.29) 
0.439 
(3.257)*** 
Error Correction 
Coefficient 
-0.337 
(-12.291)*** 
-0.337 
(-8.727)*** 
 -0.329 
(-9.75)*** 
Short-Run Coefficient  
(∆ Corporate Saving) 
-0.214 
(-2.96)*** 
-0.231 
(-3.144)*** 
 -0.081 
(-1.09) 
Constant 1.99 
(9.6)*** 
1.187 
(1.036) 
  
Government Investment 
Rate 
    
Long-Run Coefficient 
(Government Saving) 
0.062 
(4.451)*** 
1.72 
(1.117) 
1.16 
(0.28) 
0.083 
(2.759)*** 
Error Correction 
Coefficient 
-0.233 
(-7.84)*** 
-0.284 
(-6.306)*** 
 -0.194 
(-6.733)*** 
Short-Run Coefficient  
(∆ Government Saving) 
-0.049 
(-3.066)*** 
-0.058 
(3.030)*** 
 -0.051 
(-6.151)*** 
Constant 0.678 
(5.828)*** 
0.748 
(5.426)*** 
  
No. of Countries 16 16  16 
No. of Observations 374 374  374 
 
Conclusions 
 
Our goal in this paper was to re-examine the so-called Feldstein-Horioka puzzle 
introducing several data, economic and statistical innovations. Our findings, some of 
which question established assumptions and previous results in the literature, can be 
summarized as follows: (i) The national Feldstein-Horioka coefficient is in the vicinity 
of 0.5, but sectoral coefficients are much lower and even insignificantly different from 
zero; (ii) Such positive and significant national coefficient would not reflect frictions in 
international credit markets but just a fiscal current account targeting policy; (iii) 
Nevertheless, when the sample is split into deficit and surplus years, a higher and 
significant correlation emerges for the former at the national, household, and corporate 
level, implying that credit imperfections still play a role for the private but not for the 
public sector. Equally noteworthy, household correlation is still positive and significant, 
yet lower, for surplus years; and (iv) Against the background of a unitary long-run 
coefficient to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint, the long-run relationship is 
0.75 for national data, 0.6 for the corporate sector, and marginally or non-significant at 
the household and government level. 
  
 
References 
 
Angrist J. and A. Krueger (2001), “Instrumental variables and the search for 
identification: From supply and demand to natural experiments”, NBER Working 
Paper, No. 8456, September. 
 
Arellano M. and S. Bond (1991), “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte 
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations”, Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol. 58. 
 
Arellano M. and O. Bover (1995), “Another Look at the Instrumental-Variable 
Estimation of Error-Components Models”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 68, 29-51. 
 
Argimón I. and J. Roldán (1994), “Saving, Investment and International Capital 
Mobility in EC Countries”, European Economic Review, Vol. 38, 59-67. 
 
Banerjee A. and P. Zanghieri (2003), “A New Look at the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle 
Using an Integrated Panel”, Working Paper, CEPII.  
 
Bebczuk R. and K. Schmidt-Hebbel (2006), “Household and Corporate Saving: Panel 
Data Evidence”, mimeo, Banco Central de Chile.  
 
Blundell R. and S. Bond (1998), “Inicial Conditions and Moment Conditions in 
Dynamic Panel Data Models”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 87, 115-143. 
 
Boyreau G. and S. Wei (2004), “Can China Grow Faster? A Diagnosis of the 
Fragmentation of Its Domestic Capital Market”, Working Paper No.04/76, IMF. 
 
Calderón C. and K. Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), “Macroeconomic Policies and Performance 
in Latin America”, Documento de Trabajo No. 217, Banco Central de Chile. 
 
Cashin P. and P. Wickham: “International Capital Flows and National Creditworthiness: 
Do the Fundamental Things Apply as Time Goes By?”, IMF Working Paper 172/98, 
December.  
 
Coakley J., F. Kulasi  and R. Smith (1998), “The Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle and Capital 
Mobility: A Review”, International Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 3, 169-188. 
 
Coakley J. and F. Kulasi (1997), “Cointegration of Long Span Saving and Investment”, 
Economic Letters, Vol. 54, 1-6. 
 
De Vita G. and A. Abbott (2002), “Are saving and investment cointegrated? An ARDL 
bounds testing approach”, Economic Letters, Vol. 77, 293-299. 
 
Fanelli J. (2005a), “Domestic Financial Architecture, Macro Volatility and Institutions: 
The Argentine Case”, mimeo, CEDES, Buenos Aires. 
 
Fanelli J. (2005b), “International Financial Architecture, Macro Volatility and 
Institutions: The Developing World Experience”, mimeo, CEDES, Buenos Aires. 
 
Feldstein M. and C. Horioka (1980), “Domestic Saving and International Capital 
Flows”, Economic Journal, Vol. 90, 314-329.  
 
Glick R. and K. Rogoff (1995), “Global versus country-specific productivity shocks and 
the current account”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 35, 159-192. 
 
Hericourt J. and M. Maurel (2005), “The Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle Revisited: an 
“European-Regional” Perspective”, mimeo, TEAM, Paris. 
 
Hubbard R. G. (1998), “Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 36, No.1, 193-225. 
 
Iwamoto Y. and E. van Wincoop (2000), “Do Borders Matter? Evidence from Japanese 
Regional Net Capital Flows”, International Economic Review, Vol. 41, No.1, 241-269. 
 
Jansen J. (1996), “Estimating Saving-Investment Correlations: Evidence for OECD 
Countries Based on an Error Correction Model”, Journal of International Money and 
Finance, Vol. 15, 749-781. 
 
Lanteri L. (2004), “Ahorro y crecimiento: Alguna evidencia para la economía argentina, 
1970-2003”, mimeo, Banco Central de la República Argentina. 
 
Loayza N., K. Schmidt-Hebbel and L. Serven (2000), “What Drives Private Saving 
around the World?”, Review of Economics and Statistics.  
 
Obstfeld M. (1995), “International Capital Mobility in the 1990s”, in Kenen P., 
Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open Economy, Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Payne J. (2005), “Saving-Investment Correlation in Mexico”, Journal of Policy 
Modelling, September. 
 
Pelgrin F. and S. Schich (2004), “National Saving-Investment Dynamics and 
International Capital Mobility”, Working Paper 2004-14, Bank of Canada. 
 
Pesaran M. and R. Smith (1995), “Estimating Long-Run Relationships from Dynamic 
Heterogeneous Panels”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 68, No. 1, 79-113. 
 
Pesaran H., Y. Shin and R. Smith (1999), “Pooled Mean Group Estimation of Dynamic 
Heterogeneous Panels”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 94, 621-
634. 
 
Sachs J. (1981), “The current account and macroeconomic adjustment in the 1970s”, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol.1, 201-282. 
 
Sachsida, A. and M. Caetano (2000), “The Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle Revisited”, 
Economic Letters, 68, 85-88. 
 
Serven L. (2002), “Real Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Private Investment in 
Developing Countries”, Review of Economics and Statistics. 
 Taylor (2002), “A Century of Current Account Dynamics”, NBER Working Paper, No. 
8927. 
Annex: GMM and PMG Estimators 
 
Two modern dynamic panel data procedures are employed along with the more usual 
random and fixed effect techniques, namely, the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) and the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimators. Given their relative novelty in 
the applied macroeconomic field, we devote a few lines to explain how they work. 
 
GMM has two evident advantages: first, it allows to deal with the inconsistency created 
by the presence of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor; second, it allows to 
relax the assumption of strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables. Our basic 
regression will be of the form: 
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   i = 1, ..., N         t = 1, ..., T       
 
where inv is the investment rate, sav is the saving rate, i stands for each of the N cross-
section units, t represents each of the T time-series units, β1 and β2 are scalar, µi and εi,t 
are an individual-specific effect and an error term, respectively, with zero mean and 
constant and finite variance and independent of each other.  
 A major drawback with this specification is that the introduction of the lagged 
dependent variable as an explanatory variable gives rise to biased and inconsistent 
estimators. The reason is that both invi,t and invi,t-1 are functions of µi. By first-
differencing the previous equation, it is possible to account for the unobserved 
individual effects to obtain: 
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 It can be observed that there still is correlation between the lagged dependent 
variable and the new error term. If the error εi,t is serially uncorrelated [E(εi,tεi,s)=0 for t
≠s], values of inv lagged two periods or more are valid instruments, so for t ≥ 3 the 
following linear moment restrictions are satisfied: 
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 Furthermore, we will assume that the saving rate weakly exogenous, meaning 
that future (but not necessarily contemporaneous and lagged) realizations of the error 
term are uncorrelated with the x set. Formally, E(savi,tεi,s)≠0 for t≥s and E(savi,tεi,s)=0 
otherwise. This suggests that values of x lagged two periods or more serve as 
instruments, with the associated additional linear moment restrictions: 
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 Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a consistent Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator from these moment restrictions. This method has the additional 
advantage that does not rely on any particular probability distribution. Moreover, they 
distinguish a one-step and a two-step estimator, the difference being that in the latter 
case the residuals from the former are used to reestimate the coefficients.  
 
Nonetheless, Blundell and Bond (1998) notice that lagged levels of the dependent 
variable may become poor instruments as far as this variable is highly persistent over 
time –as a matter of fact, the estimated coefficient is biased toward zero when the 
autorregressive parameter approaches one. In such a case,  lagged differences of the 
dependent variable can serve as suitable instruments in the level regressions, provided 
this new instrument is uncorrelated with the fixed effect, which in turn require that the 
dependent variable be mean stationary. All this boils down into an additional set of 
moment restrictions: 
 
0)])([(
,2,1,
=+−
−− tiititi
invinvE εη        
0)])([(
,2,1,
=+−
−− tiititi
savsavE εη             t = 3, ..., T       
 
By stacking  the equations in differences with the equations in levels, a GMM system 
estimator results with superior performance in terms of unbiasedness and asymptotic 
efficiency. 
 
An additional issue we would like to address is whether short- and long-run effects can 
be distinguished. Standard panel data techniques restrict the estimated coefficients to be 
the same for all cross-section units, allowing at most for group-specific intercepts by 
using fixed-effects. At the other extreme, in the case of full panel heterogeneity, a mean 
group (MG) estimator -the average of the estimated coefficients from separate equations 
for each group- is consistent. Since in most cases we should expect parameter 
homogeneity in the long-run but not in the short-run, an intermediate estimator should 
be considered. The Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin 
and Smith (1999) appears as a sensible alternative. If the long-run homogeneity 
constraint is valid, the PMG will be consistent and efficient, but if it is not, it will be, 
unlike the MG estimator, inconsistent. This constraint can be tested with a Hausman test 
on each explanatory variable. Another caveat of the MG estimator is that, when the time 
and cross-section dimensions are short, it is quite sensitive to outliying country 
estimates. This comes from the fact that the MG estimator is an unweighted average of 
individual group estimators, and thus it suffers from the same problem as any average. 
The PMG estimator is more akin to a weighted average. Specifically, the method first 
estimates the common or pooled  long-run coefficients, and then uses them to estimate 
the short-run coefficients and the speed of adjustment. The unweighted average of all 
these estimates is a consistent estimate of the short-run effects. 
 
Suppose that the  investment rate follows an autorregressive, distributed lag (ARDL)  
process of order (1, 1): 
 
ittiittiiit
savsavinvinv εβββµ ++++=
−− 1,321,1
 
 
Substracting invit,-1 from both sides and adding and substracting β3savit in the right-hand 
side, we obtain the error correction equation: 
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where s
*
 is the common long-run solution and ∆ is the difference operator. The PMG 
first estimates the common long-run effects [ ])1/(
1
βµ −
i
 and [ ])1/()( 132 βββ −+  to 
later on estimate the short-run coefficient β3 and the speed of adjustment [ ])1( 1β−− . 
 
